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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a Utah
corporation,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)
)

vs.

)

)

UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corporation, aka WESTMOR; RAMSHIRE,
INC., a corporation; WILLIAM
R. STEVENSON; PARK CITY
RESERVATIONS, INC., a corporation, dba SKYLINE REALTY;
HARRY F. REED; and GARY COLE,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17359

)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents.
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
PARK CITY RESERVATIONS, INC., dba SKYLINE REALTY,
HARRY F. REED, AND GARY COLE
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action involves a dispute as to whether or not respondent
Park City Reservations, Inc., a real estate office, is entitled to
receive a portion of a real estate commission which relates to the
sale of certain properties in Park City, or whether the entire real
estate commission should go to appellant, another real estate office
located in Park City.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a trial, Judge Sawaya of the Third District Court decided
against appellant on all of the claims asserted against Park City
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Reservations, Inc., Reed, and Cole (for purposes of this brief these
appellees where appropriate will be collectively referred to as
"PCR").

Th e T ria
. 1 Court ruled in favor of Park City Reservations,

Inc., on the counterclaim which was awarded sixty percent (60%) ofa
real estate commission.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
PCR, Reed, and Cole, request that the Trial Court judgment be
affirmed in all respects.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts set forth below do not encompass all of the factual
assertions made by appellant.
by

appellant

respondents.

relate

only

Therefore,

Many of the factual assertions made

to

Unionamerica

and

not

respondents

set

forth only the

these

to

these

factual contentions which are relevant to claims by and against PCR.
1.

Appellant is a Utah corporation whose chief executive

officer had a valid broker's license under the laws of the State of
Utah.
2.

Unionamerica and its wholly owned subsidiary Ramshire were

foreign corporations who did business within the State of Utah.

For

purposes of this brief these defendants will also treat Unionamerica
and Ramshire as one and the same.
3.

PCR was a Utah corporation with its principal place of

business in Summit County and whose shares were owned by Harry F.

-2-
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Reed.

PCR,

doing business as Skyline, was both a defendant and

counterclaimant in the Trial Court.
4.

Harry Reed was a duly licensed real estate broker who was

employed by Skyline Realty in Park City.

At all times relevant to

this action Skyline Realty was a branch brokerage of Skyline Real
Estate located in Salt Lake City and as such was registered with the
Utah Department

of Business Regulations.

Harry Reed was the

registered broker/branch manager of Skyline Realty
Appeal p. 773-Exhibit 43).
some time in 1973.

(Record on

Harry Reed established Skyline Realty

The exact date Skyline Realty was established as

a sole proprietorship is not part of the record except insofar as it
is included in an affidavit submitted from the Secretary of State's
office which will be discussed in subsequent pages of this brief.
Mr. Ladd Christensen was the real estate broker for Skyline Real
Estate and Investment Company out of Salt Lake City.

Although

Skyline Realty was a branch brokerage for Skyline Real Estate and
Investment Company, it was owned by Harry Reed.

On December 11,

1974, Harry Reed incorporated the branch brokerage and took as its
name Park City Reservations, Inc., d/b/a Skyline Realty.

Mr. Reed

testified that it was his understanding that PCR was entitled to do
business in the name of Skyline Realty.

(T. 428.)

PCR d/b/a Skyline

Realty, continued to do business at all times relevant herein as a
branch brokerage of Skyline Real Estate and Investment Company·
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5.

As

set

forth

above,

PCR

does

not

agree

that Ladd

Christensen's company was a different company than PCR during the
periods in question.

PCR was a separate corporation from Ladd

Christensen's company but was also a branch office.

PCR is aware o'
, I

no rule or regulation precluding a branch brokerage from being
separately incorporated.

Reed and the Utah Department of Business

Regulations treated Sk:,·line Realty as a branch brokerage of Ladd
Christensen.

Harry Reed was

Broker for Skyline.
6.

listed as the official Real Estate

(Record on Appeal p. 783 - Ex. 46.)

PCR disagrees with appellant's factual assertions claiming

Reed was never a broker for PCR nor that PCR was licensed by the
state.

Skyline Realty was a branch brokerage with Harry Reed as the

licensed broker.

(Record on Appeal p. 773 - Ex. 43; Record on Appeal

pp. 782-783 - Ex. 46.)

Skyline Realty was the assumed name for PCR

as will be established in subsequent discussions.
7.

PCR does not know the dates on which appellant's counsel

first inquired of the office of the Secretary of State to ascertain
if a

certificate to conduct business under the assumed name of

Skyline Realty had been filed by PCR.

PCR contends it was not

advised until

appellant was

challenge
factual

late

capacity.

in the

trial

that

(T. 586-587.)

investigation

by

Further,

appellant's

PCR

counsel

going to

contends the

missed

certain

documents in the office of the Secretary of State which indicated
that in fact PCR did file an assumed name certificate for Skyline
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Realty.

These factual circumstances will be discussed in greater

detail in subsequent portions of this brief.

Similarly, PCR will

analyze the claim that PCR was not a licensed corporate real estate
broker.

PCR contends that under its assumed name of Skyline Realty

with its broker/branch manager Harry Reed, PCR was entitled to act
as a real estate brokerage.
8.

Reed testified that for purposes of this lawsuit PCR,

Skyline Realty and Investment Company, and Skyline Realty, Inc.,
were different names utilized by the same corporate entity.
9.

PCR disagrees with appellant that there was no evidence

proffered or presented that any assumed name certificate had been
filed.

PCR specifically asserts that a proffer was made that in fact

the assumed name certificate had been filed.
10.

(T. 651, 653.)

Appellant is in error in claiming respondents first claimed

appellant had waived any capacity defense only during the final
argument.

PCR objected to the evidence relating to capacity on the

grounds that there was no defense in the pleadings claiming Reed was
not

a

broker

affirmatively.

and

such

(T. 587.)

a

defense

would have

to

be

raised

Further, PCR objected to the exhibits

which related to the lack of filing of an assumed name certificate.
There is a significant discussion on the record concerning the
objection.

(T.

638-641.)

The argument concerning the objection

relates specifically to the issue of surprise and to the issue of
capacity.

The Trial Court ruled that respondents' counsel was not
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surprised and that respondents in fact had the same opportunity to
look at the records as appellant.

The section of this brief that

deals with the filing of the assumed name certificate demonstrates
that respondents were in fact

surprised and could have met the

evidence given adequate notice.

Therefore the ruling was in error.

11.

Gary Cole has a real estate sales license issued by the

State of Utah.

PCR doe~ not know what appellant means wherein it

claims that Cole was

licensed under Christensen as

broker" and under Reed as a "broker/branch manager".

a

"primary

PCR is unable

to find any statute or regulation defining the terms primary broker
and

therefore

is

unable

to

understand

characterization asserted by appellant.

the

nature

of

the

Exhibit P. 46, cited by

appellant as authority for the proposition,

does not list Ladd

Christensen as a primary broker over Gary Cole.

Exhibit P. 46

indicates on the second page that Harry Reed is the official broker
under whom Gary Cole was operating.
12.

There was a prior lawsuit between Taylor and Unionamerica

and there was a listing agreement and a settlement agreement that
arose out of that lawsuit.

PCR did not know the specific terms of

the agreement nor did it participate in the prior litigation.

The

settlement agreement required appellant to perform the usual real
estate broker activities encumbant upon a listing broker.

The Trial

Court found that appellant in fact discharged all obligations to be
performed pursuant to the settlement agreement.
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13.

The settlement agreement provided that Taylor was to obtain

the listing on properties sold by Unionamerica in Park City.
further provided there would be a

6% commission on sales

It
of

properties which would be split 60% to the selling broker and 40% to
the listing broker.

The settlement agreement does not require that

the payment would first be made to the listing broker who would then
split the commissions with the selling broker.
14.
City.

There was no written multiple listing agreement in Park
Harry Reed testified that generally brokers would split

commissions with 60% going to the selling broker and 40% going to the
listing broker.
arrangement
service.

PCR disagrees with appellant that in fact the

in Park City would qualify as

a multiple listing

Reed testified that although brokers would generally split

commissions on the 60/40 basis, Hal Taylor as the broker for Hal
Taylor Associates had not entered into that agreement.

(T. 480.)

Reed indicated there was an informal listing arrangement between
certain brokers (not Hal Taylor) in Park City.

Reed testified it was

a simple understanding between brokers concerning the 60/40 split
rather than a signed agreement.

(T. 491.)

Harry Reed attempted to

abide by the customs and practices of realtors in Park City.

PCR

affirmatively alleges that although Taylor had not participated
generally in the Park City oral agreement that fact is not relevant
to this inquiry since there were two occasions that Reed and Taylor
specifically agreed to the 60/40 split should the village land be
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sold.

One of those agreements occurred prior to the time Davis ever

cameonthesceneandoneafter.
15.

(T. 56-57, 117-119, 150.)

Stevenson, a vice-president of Unionamerica, had a general

understanding that the brokers in Park City would split a listing on
a 60/40 basis.
the

60/40

Further, Stevenson testified that the reason he put

requirement

in the settlement agreement with Taylor

(Exhibit 2) was to mak~ certain there would be no question ~
anyone's mind that they could get a commission if they could sell the
property.
16.

(T. 292.)
At the time the settlement agreement was entered into,

Unionamerica signed the listing agreement with appellant relating
to the village land.
17.

PCR absolutely disagrees

appellant

in

paragraph

25

with the characterization of

that

the

evidence

demonstrated

Unionamerica was unwilling to sell the village land for the listing
price.

The pages referred to in appellant's brief (T. 382, 383),

simply do not say what appellant contends.

Reading the pages in

question the only thing that can accurately be taken from testimony
is that Unionamerica did not know whether they wanted to sell the
village

land at

$1,685,000.00.

Stevenson

never

said

he was

not willing to sell the village land for that amount of money.
Stevenson did not testify that he had any hidden price that he kept
from Hal Taylor.

Stevenson stated he didn't know whether he wanted

to sell it for $1,685,000.00 and he never told Taylor he would not
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sell for that amount of money.

Stevenson did not say that in fact he

would not sell for that amount of money if an offer were received.
Ultimately

Stevenson

sold

the

village

land

for

less

than

$1,685,000.00.
18.

Stevenson did testify that Dempsey indicated a definite

interest in purchasing the village land.

(T. 306.)

Stevenson did

not testify that he did not properly respond to Dempsey's overtures.
Stevenson merely said that he did not want to come off his asking
price by giving a counter offer back to Dempsey.

Further, Stevenson

did not testify that he was severely reprimanded by his boss at
Unionamerica.

Stevenson merely said that he considered he received

a "chewing out" when Stevenson's boss told Stevenson to take care of
the Dempsey situation and respond to the offer.

(T.

310.)

cannot find any indication of a "severe reprimand".
19.

Judge Croft ruled that:
"the settlement agreement and the listing
agreement contemplate that other parties
not involved in the lawsuit might find
buyers for the listed properties and
negotiate a sale therefore, and that
neither agreement contains any express or
implied provisions that Unionamerica or
Ramshire would direct any "walk-in buyer"
to plaintiffs. Such issues are thus now
resolved for all future proceedings in
this case."

The ruling was made pursuant to a motion for summary judgment
or in the alternative partial summary judgment.
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PCR

20.

Judge Sawaya properly indicated it was

function to overrule Judge Croft.

not his

Paragraph 27 of the Findings

of Fact made a further determination that Skyline Realty fully
performed all of the obligations required of a selling broker
under the fee splitting agreement reached between Skyline and
appellant.

(Appendix

, Finding of Fact 27.)

This finding is

independent of Judge Croft's finding and in and of itself would
operate as an independent basis for recovery by Skyline.
21.

The definition of a "walk-in," for purposes of this

case is a potential buyer who comes to the owner unsolicited
and is not referred to the owner by a licensed real estate
agent.
22.
as

The evidence is disputed regarding custom and practice

applied to the

listing arrangement

appellant's part of the arrangement.

in Park City

and

However, regardless of

the custom of practice, in this action Skyline became eligible
to become a selling broker and particpate in the commission
because:

(a)

Appellant and Unionamerica entered into the

settlement agreement specifically providing that a selling
broker would be entitled to receive 60% of the commission
(Exhibit 2); and (b)

Hal Taylor made a specific agreement with

each of the brokers in Park City right after signing the
listing agreement that he would split the commission 60/40
should any of those real tors be able to sell the property·
56-57, 117-119, 150.)
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31.

The settlement agreement (Exhibit 2) did not specify

the details of

any

listing required.

PCR disagrees with

appellant that there was credible testimony disclosing customs
and practices in the State of Utah which defining differences
between an exclusive right to sell or an exclusive agency
listing.

Each listing is nothing more than a contract which

sets out its own terms and conditions.

Hal Taylor is the only

witness called by appellant who had experience in Park City who
attempted to explain the differences between the two different
types of listings.

Hal Taylor specifically testified that he

had never had any experience with an agreement known as an
exclusive agency contract.

(T.

137.)

Hal Taylor testified

that his understanding as to the differentiation came from
reading it in a book rather than gaining such an understanding
from customs and practices in the industry.

(T. 138.) The only

other witness called by appellant in an attempt to establish
such customs and practices was Edward J. Conry, an Assistant
Professor of Business Administration at Utah State University.
Although Mr. Conry was initially questioned concerning customs
and practices regarding the difference between an exclusive
agency contract and an exclusive right to sell contract, Mr.
Conry

subsequently testified in fact he did not have the

background enabling him to comment on a comparison.

Mr. Conry

specifically stated that any distinctions he knew of between an

-11-
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.....

exclusive right to sell and an exclusive agency listing were
pure speculation.

(T. 580.)

Conry specifically stated that he

had had very little experience with exclusive agency contracts
and was guessing as to their characteristics.
To quote Conry:

(T. 580-581.)

"I am incompetent to articulate clearly what

industry practices are with regard to the exclusive agency."
(T. 581.)

24.

Reed testified that one of the standard forms in his

office was the same form that was signed by Unionamerica with
regard to the listing on the village land involved herein.
However, Reed also testified that he did not know which listing
form Taylor had with Unionamerica.

(T.

448.)

Reed also

testified that generally with a special piece of property such
as the village land more often than not there was a specially
created listing contract rather than a standard form.

(T.

448.)
25.

PCR agrees with some of the statements made in

paragraph 34 of appellant's

Statement of Facts.

However,

appellant casts them in a light in which they were not received
at trial.

Stevenson did not

couch his desire that other

brokers be able to sell the village land in terms of whether or
not such a desire was consistent or inconsistent with an
exclusive right to sell.
the

factual

statements

Therefore, in order to fairly analyze
contained

in

paragraph

34
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of

appellant's brief, PCR will go through each fact and give its
understanding as to what was introduced and received at trial.
(a) (b) (c)

Stevenson had not listed the village

land prior to entering into the settlement agreement with
Taylor because Stevenson thought there would be more
inducement for realtors to sell the land if they could
receive the full commission.

When Stevenson executed the

settlement agreement with Taylor (Exhibit 2), Stevenson
required

the

60/40

split

commission

so

that

other

realtors in Park City would have the incentive to make a
sale.
the

Neither the settlement agreement (Exhibit 2) nor
listing

agreement

(Exhibit

3)

sets

forth

any

obligation of Unionamerica with regard to a "walk-in"
purchaser.
(d)

Mr. Ray Johnson, the representative of Greater

Park City Company,

testified that

there was an oral

agreement between Greater Park City Company and appellant
wherein Greater Park City Company would refer walk-in
purchasers to Hal Taylor Associates.

(T. 203.)

It should

be noted that Greater Park City Company and Unionamerica
were

different

companies

who

both entered

into

an

agreement to settle pending litigation with Hal Taylor
when

the

listing agreements were signed.

Stevenson

testified that although Greater Park City Company may
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have entered into a separate oral agreement to refer walkin' s to appellant, Unionamerica did not make such an oral
agreement.

(T. 295-297.)

The Trial Court in its fact

finding function determined that Stevenson told the truth
and entered a specific finding that no oral agreement
existed which modified the settlement agreement and
which,

therefore,

~ould

have required Unionamerica to

refer walk-in's to Hal Taylor.

(Appendix A, Finding 11.)

It should further be noted that Stevenson's version of the
conversation between Taylor and Johnson is different than
that presented by appellant

in its brief.

Stevenson

testified that at the time of the settlement, Hal Taylor
indicated to Greater Park City Company that Greater Park
City Company was not listing all of its properties with
Hal Taylor.

Since GPCC was not

listing all of its

properties, Hal Taylor wanted to be protected in the event
a

person came along during a

subsequent period and

requested that GPCC sell a particular piece of property
that was not listed.

According to Stevenson, Ray Johnson

agreed that should a purchaser approach GPCC about an
unlisted property, Hal Taylor would receive a commission
in the event a sale occurred.

Stevenson did not believe

that the agreement between GPCC and Taylor referred to the
type of walk-in involved wherein a property was already

-14-
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listed and a potential purchaser merely wanted to be put
in touch with

a

real

estate

agent.

(T.

295-297.)

Appellant has apparently confused the two together.
(e)

PCR agrees that the oral understanding between

Taylor and GPCC occurred because GPCC was not listing all
of

its

properties.

contention
between

that

PCR

disagrees

with

appellant's

the only reason the oral agreement

appellant

and

Unionamerica was

not

reached

relating to a walk-in was because there were no properties
to be

listed.

Stevenson specifically indicated that

appellant's counsel was confusing the term walk-in as
used in this case with the term walk-in referred to in the
agreement

between

GPCC

and

Hal

Taylor.

Stevenson

specifically indicated that there was no agreement to
refer a walk-in such as Mr. Davis to Hal Taylor.
Court believed Mr. Stevenson.
26.

The Trial

(T. 294-302.)

A listing broker may put signs on the property with the

listing broker's name, address and telephone number and that
generally the listing broker has a better access than the
owner.

PCR disagrees with appellant's contention that under an

exclusive right to sell listing, the broker is entitled to any
referral the owner might make.

The portions of the transcript

cited by appellant simply do not support appellant in that
contention.

-15-
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27.

With regard to the factual assertions by appellant

relating to
brokers,

the nature of the

there

assertions

is

substantial

are mainly argument

evidence received at trial.
must

set

legal arrangement between
disagreement.

Appellant's

and are not indicative of

In order to focus this issue, PCR

forth its belief as

to

the legal relationships

existing between the parties involved in this case.
(a)

PCR disagrees with appellant that the selling

broker becomes an agent of the listing broker and a subagent of the owner.

There is no custom or practice

evidence before the Court establishing such a finding.
With regard to distributing money from a sale, there is no
evidence indicating a selling broker only has access to
the money through the listing broker.

In fact, evidence

received indicates in Park City that the selling broker is
the entity who generally collecting and distributing the
money.

(T. 602-605.)

Reed testified that with regard to

Skyline's transactions with Taylor, prior to the sale of
the village

land,

the

selling

broker

received

disbursed the money in ten out of ten instances.

and
(T.

604.)
(b)

PCR disagrees with several of the factual

contentions made by appellant that there was evidence of a
custom and practice in the real estate industry requiring
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-an owner to refer a "walk- in" to a listing broker.

There

was no credible testimony whatsoever relating to that
specific

issue which established

practice

in

Park

City.

The

only

such

a

custom and

possible evidence

appellant could be referring to would be the testimony of
appellant's purported expert who gave a legal opinion as
to the obligation for referring a walk-in.

Clearly the

legal opinion was not binding on the Court.

Appellant has

not cited nor can appellant cite to any credible evidence
relating to

a custom and practice involving walk-ins

since appellants introduced no such evidence.
appellant
doubtful

introduced such evidence,
whether

Unionamerica

it

could

is

be

Even had

extremely

held

as

a

contractual obligation to a custom and practice.
28.

On May 15, 1978, a portion of the village land was

conveyed by Unionamerica to Jack W. Davis, Inc.

Pursuant to

the findings of the Trial Court, appellant was entitled to 40%
of the $96,000 and PCR to the remaining 60%.

(Appendix A,

paragraph 6, Conclusions of Law.)
29.

PCR concedes that Reed and Cole acted as agents for

Davis regarding portions of this transaction.
30.

Paragraph 42 of appellant's brief is nothing more than

argument completely ignoring portions of the record.
facts

Since the

contained in paragraph 42 directly relate to PCR' s
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involvement in the sale, appellees find it necessary to go into
great detail to accurately reflect the Trial Court record.
The appellant attempts to take the position that PCR is
not

entitled to

the

commission because PCR was

"procuring cause" of the sale.

not

the

In support of this position

appellant has drawn a chart in its brief of several events
which is supposed to d2monstrate the minimum nature of PCR's
involvement in the sale.

(Appellant's brief pp. 37-40.)

An

analysis of all of the facts indicates that the chart is
neither complete nor accurate.

Further, appellant totally

misunderstands the efforts made by PCR to insure that the
transaction would go through.
Davis heard of the village land from a Mr. Luce who is on
the Board of Directors of Unionamerica.

However, Davis was

merely told by Luce that there was some property in Park City
that Davis might be interested in.

(Davis Depo. pp. 14, 17-18.

Davis testified through deposition which by stipulation was
not transcribed as a part of the trial transcript.

Therefore,

references to the Davis testimony will be to his deposition.)
At no

time did Davis indicate he was going to purchase the land

prior to seeing it or prior to having communications with
Unionamerica concerning his

purchase price.

There is no

testimony in the record indicating Davis decided to purchase
the property prior to visiting it.

Indeed, it would be absurd

-18-
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to believe Mr. Davis would spend 1.6 million dollars for a
piece of property he had never seen nor discussed with the
owner in any depth whatsoever.
to Davis'

seeing

All of the communications prior

the property merely amounted to Davis'

expressing an interest, a meeting being arranged for Davis to
look at the property, and the sending of a feasibility study to
Davis which set forth a possible use of the land.
went to Park City to look at the land.

Davis then

On the night before his

visit, Stevenson, one of the officers of Unionamerica and a
resident of California, was advised by his superior Volk that
Volk would not be able to meet with Davis.
Mr.

At about that time

Stevenson learned that Hal Taylor was in the State of

California and was not available in Utah.

Mr. Stevenson, after

learning that Mr. Volk would not be able to participate with
Davis in looking at the property then called Gary Cole, a
licensed real estate salesman and resident of Park City.
Stevenson met with Reed and Cole for approximately ten or
fifteen minutes on the evening of October 3 and inquired if
Reed and Cole would be available if Davis required assistance.
Reed and Cole indicated they would make themselves available.
(T. 339.)

Later that evening Mr. Stevenson met Mr. Davis and

his wife at a restaurant in Park City where they discussed for
several hours various items including the kind of business the
Davis' had, their preferred method of doing business, Davis'
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questions concerning Park City in general and the feasibility
study.

(T. 341.)

As a result of the meeting with the Davis',

Stevenson called either Reed or Cole and requested a breakfast
meeting

the

next

morning.

(T.

342. )

At

breakfast

the

following morning all five of the individuals met (Reed, Cole,
Stevenson, and Mr. and Mrs. Davis).
in Reed's car and the
village

land.

D~vis',

The individuals then left

for the first time,

Reed testified that

saw the

at the meeting on the

morning of the 4th at the Eating Establishment Davis asked
several questions, which Reed and Cole were able to answer
concerning what was happening in Park City, where things were
going, and what types of things the planning people might do.
(T.

457-458.)

Reed testified that

they talked about the

village land, industry in Park City, revenue bonds, and methods
available

for

financing

property

purchases.

explained prices of condominiums in the area,

Reed

also

what other

projects were being built, and in fact showed Mr. Davis other
projects.

(T.

458-459.)

Reed testified that they did a

"pretty thorough job of presenting the real estate industry in
Park City to Mr. Davis."

(T. 459.)

Reed indicated that his

involvement was much greater than Stevenson's concerning what
was

occurring in Park City,

revenue bonds.

(T.

development,

financing,

.)

-20-
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and

Mr.

Davis'

recollection of the meeting coincides with

that of Reed and Stevenson.

Davis testified that within a few

minutes of the meeting with Reed and Cole, Davis decided he
wanted Reed and Cole to represent him regarding Park City
activities (Davis Depo. p. 35.)

Davis further testified that

his manner of doing business was that he always wanted local
people to participate in such transactions.

Davis decided

after meeting with Reed and Cole a very short time that these
people were knowledgeable, and met his needs with regard to
Park City.

(Davis Depo. p. 35.)

After seeing the property and receiving an explanation
from Reed regarding the general nature of industry in Park
City,

Davis

testified

returned

that

he

to

California.

received

a

Subsequently,

telephone call

Reed

from Davis

requesting Reed and Cole were asked to travel to San Diego to
discuss preparing an earnest money offer to purchase.

It is

apparently appellant's contention that a few days after Davis
visited the property, Davis called Volk and orally agreed to
purchase the land at Unionamerica's asking price prior to Reed
and Cole making the trip to prepare and present an earnest
money offer.

Appellant also contends that the communication

between Davis and Volk resulted in Volk' s ordering Stevenson to
ensure consummation of the village land sale.

The attempts to

establish is that Reed and Cole needed to do nothing further in
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order to cause the sale to go through.

However, Stevenson

denied that in fact Volk called and told him that Davis had
agreed to the purchase.

(T. 343.)

such a call (Davis Depo. p. 33).

Davis also denied making

Reed testified that prior to

going to California to discuss drafting an earnest money
agreement with Davis, Reed was never advised that an agreement
had already been made
(T. 466.)

a~d

Reed need only work out its terms.

The Trial Court was entitled in its fact finding

function to believe Stevenson and Davis rather than Volk.

In

fact, it is difficult to believe Davis would commit to a 1.6
million

dollar

purchase

subsequently occurred.

without

the

dickering

that

However, it is irrelevant whether the

Trial Court believed Stevenson and Davis or Volk.

The truth of

the matter is appellant cannot contend there was any kind of
binding offer and acceptance prior to the submission and
acceptance of the earnest money offer, which was completely
handled by Reed and Cole.
Subsequent to the meeting in Park City, Reed and Cole
contacted Davis and made an appointment to go to San Diego.
410.)

(T.

On the 16th of October they went to San Diego, California

and spent the evening with Mr. and Mrs. Davis at their home.
During that evening they talked about Park City.

(T. 411.)

Further, Reed and Cole took to San Diego an earnest money blank
on a Utah form.

(T. 411.)

On the morning of October 17th,
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Reed, Cole, and Davis went to Davis' office to discuss the
terms

of

the offer which were eventually memorialized in

Exhibit "9".

As a result of those discussions a somewhat

complicated earnest money was drafted.

The buyer under the

earnest money was required to deposit $5,000 with Skyline.
414.)

(T.

The offer was presented by Reed and Cole and after some

further discussions was accepted by Unionamerica.
A very

essential

portion

of

this

transaction

that

appellant completely ignores in its brief concerns the period
of time

subsequent

agreement.

to

the signing of the

earnest

money

According to appellant's brief, the transaction

was completed when the real estate agreement was executed by
Unionamerica and Davis on October 24, 1977.
the case.

That simply is not

A close reading of the earnest money agreement and

the real estate agreement (Ex. 12) both of which were executed
in October of 1977 demonstrates that the buyer did not simply
agree to pay the purchase price to Unionamerica.

The buyer, a

developer out of California, kept his options open by allowing
himself a period of time wherein he could withdraw from the
subject transaction.

Exhibit "9", the Earnest Money Offer,

made the sale contingent on numerous conditions set forth on an
attachment "B" which was part of the earnest money agreement.
Further, the sale was contingent upon buyer's acceptance of the
preliminary title report.

Attachment "B" to the earnest money
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agreement provided that there would be a final escrow agreement
which would have to be prepared.
fact

for

a

transaction

this

It was contemplated that in

complex,

the parties would

immediately meet in Utah to draft a contract.

The earnest

money further provided that the closing for the sale would be
held within 160 days after the final agreement was signed.
final

agreement was

th~

The

real estate agreement which was

negotiated and executed approximately one week after the
earnest money on October 24, 1977.
exhibit

demonstrates

that

the

A close reading of the

transaction was

far

from

complete.
Jack W. Davis,

Inc.,

the buyer, made certain that an

escape clause was included wherein Davis could analyze whether
or not the property was suitable for development.

For example,

within 60 days of the signing of the real estate agreement
buyer was entitled to terminate the contract and receive the
entire down payment back.

If the transaction were terminated

by Davis between 60 and 100 days, various penalty provisions
applied.

For example, between 60 and 90 days, the buyer would

receive $20,000 and the seller would receive $10,000.

More

than 90 days the seller would receive $20,000 and the buyer
would receive $10,000.

More than 120 days the buyer would

receive nothing back and the seller would receive $30,000.

In

other words, Davis knew there would be substantial work to be
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done prior to determining if the purchase was feasible.

The

parties further agreed that no commission would be due until
after the initial closing which would occur on or before April
1, 1978, allowing time for the withdrawal periods by Davis to
expire.

Harry Reed testified that most of the work in putting

the sale

together actually occurred after the signing of

Exhibit "12".

In other words, for the commission to be due,

Davis would have to decide that he was not going to withdraw
from the contract and would press forward.
Reed testified that in the approximate seven month period
between the time the real estate sales agreement was signed and
the closing occurred, he spent an extensive amount of time
working on the project and Gary Cole spent almost full time
working on the project.

(T. 597-598.)

Reed testified that he

was well aware the transaction was not final until after the
interim periods had passed and Davis decided the project made
economic sense.

(T. 598.)

Reed testified that to ensure the

property would be viable and the sale would occur his office
did the following:
(a)

Worked with Davis and his architect to come up

with ideas of types of things to put on the village land.
For example, Reed testified that although the feasibility
study provided for only 44 units, the work Reed and Cole
did with the architect ultimately resulted in 82 units
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being placed on the village land.

That significantly

reduced the cost of the land per unit.
(b)

(T. 598-599.)

Reed testified that he and Cole worked with

architects and engineers in order to have the plans
approved by various goverrunental bodies.

(T. 599.) Reed

testified they went to planning commission meetings and
also discussed their proposed plan for the village land
individually with members of the planning commission.
Reed testified they worked closely with the Snyderville
Sewer Basin Board and expended an extensive amount of time
with the Fire Board, a separate goverrunental entity.

Reed

testified he and Cole attended 15 to 20 meetings with
goverrunental bodies alone in an attempt to gain approval
of their proposed plan for the village land.

(T. 600.)

Reed testified they obtained a conditional use permit
within existing zoning requirements due to

the novel

approach of using a hotel exception which enabled them to
build more units

on the village

land.

All of this

activity took place prior to the final closing and during
the time Mr. Davis could have withdrawn.

(T. 600.)

Reed

further testified that Taylor was not present at any of
those meetings nor did he assist in preparing for the
meetings.

-26-
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In addition to the foregoing, Reed testified that Reed and
Cole worked extensively with possible lenders and/or friends
of Jack Davis who would assist or encourage people to purchase
units proposed for construction on the village land.
efforts

strengthened

village land.
financial

Davis'

(T. 601.)

people

to

commitments

to

These

purchase

the

Reed indicated that Davis brought key

Park

City

and

Reed

and

Cole

spent

substantial amounts of time selling the town and selling the
project in order to get them excited about Park City.

Reed

indicated they dealt with approximately 20 people just meeting
acquaintances sent up from various financial institutions.
Reed testified that he and Cole even went to Los Angeles and
located the first limited partner to purchase a portion of the
limited partnership which was to own the village land.

Reed

indicated that people Reed obtained invested $100,000 in the
limited partnership.
before.

These were people Reed had worked with

(T. 602.)

It is a complete misstatement of the evidence to indicate
the sale was completed merely by signing the earnest money
agreement or the real estate agreement.

The appellant Taylor,

did not even believe that the signing of the October agreements
consummated the sale.

Taylor objected to the earnest money

because it was nothing more than an option.

Taylor did not

think it was a very good offer because Davis was tying up the
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property

for a

substantial amount of time by only paying

$25, 000.

(T. 86, 131.)

Taylor recognized that most of the work

on this kind of transaction is often done after the initial
documents are signed but prior to the closing.
31.

At

the

closing wherein

the

(T. 159-160.)

monies

were

to

be

disbursed, Reed and Cole appeared with Davis and Stevenson to
finalize the

transactic~.

Taylor appeared at that meeting and

contended that Reed and Cole were not entitled to any of the
commission.

(T.

90.)

It was

and apparently is Taylor's

position that because Unionamerica had first encountered the
buyer, PCR was not entitled to the commission from the sale.
32.

When the dispute about the monies became apparent,

Unionamerica decided to deposit the funds in an escrow account
until the matter could be agreed upon by the various parties or
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.

There is no

evidence that Reed or Cole ever had control over the monies.
33.
to

the

Reed and Cole contended that Taylor had lost his right
commission by

settlement agreement.

virtue

of

Taylor's

breaching

the

It is PCR's position that when Taylor

refused to give 60% of the commission to Skyline he breached
his contract with Unionamerica.
34.

PCR agrees that the Trial Court refused to admit into

evidence the Spring, 1979 issue of volume III issue of "Utah
Real Estate News".

PCR asserts

that the Trial Court was
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correct in that it did not admit the article and further, even

if the Trial Court was

incorrect,

prejudicial effect on appellant.

there was no possible

Appellant is attempting to

claim PCR was a sub-agent of Taylor by virtue of the article
contained in the Real Estate News.

There is nothing in the

evidence that would establish custom or practice that would
make PCR a sub-agent of Taylor and the article merely states a
legal conclusion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING A SELLING BROKER' S
COMMISSION TO PCR.
A. JUDGE CROFT 'S ORDER DOES NOT PRECLUDE PCR FROM RECEIVING THE
COMMISSION.
Appellant's position with regard to Judge Croft's Order
granting

partial

summary

judgment

interpretation of the Order itself.

is

not

a

reasonable

The only way appellant can

contend the Order is contradictory is by stretching the language
out of proportion from its obvious meaning.

Judge Croft merely

looked at the two agreements between Hal Taylor and Unionamerica
and determined that based upon those agreements there was no
requirement that Unionamerica refer any walk-in purchasers to
Taylor.

Judge Croft did not hold, as appellant contends, that

for another realtor to gain a part of the commission that
realtor must (1) encounter the purchaser in a manner other than
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Davis was encountered - as a walk-in; and (2) negotiate the
transaction.

Judge

Croft

specifically

held

that

since

Unionamerica was not obligated to refer walk-ins to Taylor,
other realtors could find and negotiate for the sale of the
land.

Since the motion for summary judgment came up in the

context of whether or not under these facts Unionamerica was
obligated to

refer Da·;is

to Taylor and Judge Croft

Unionamerica was not so obligated,

found

it is inconceivable that

Judge Croft could mean what appellant contends he did mean.
Rather than further burdening the record by repeating the
arguments made by Unionamerica in its brief, PCR hereby adopts
such arguments.

In any event, the totality of the order clearly

indicates Judge Croft did not rule that PCR was not entitled to
the commission because they did not first encounter Davis.

If

Judge Croft had meant to say that he would have done so.
B.
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD ESTABLISHING
PCR AS THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SUBJECT SALE.
THE LISTING AND THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Appellant

contends

that the agreement between Taylor and

Unionamerica was an "exclusive right to sell" agreement rather than
what

has

been

categorized

an

"exclusive

agency"

agreement.

Unionamerica has contradicted appellant's position by pointing out
that the settlement agreement modified the listing agreement in a
very substantial manner.

Normally, a listing realtor has the option

of deciding whether he wants to split his commission and allow
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another listing realtor to sell property or to try to sell it
himself.

In this instance Hal Taylor was not given that option but

was required by virtue of the settlement agreement to split the
commission on a 60/40 basis with any other realtor who was able to
sell the property.

Unionamerica, in its brief, argues the import of

the settlement agreement as it related to the listing agreement.
PCR will not repeat the arguments made by Unionamerica.

However, it

is PCR's position that it doesn't matter whether the agreement is
categorized as an exclusive right to sell or an exclusive agency or
an exclusive right
agreement.

to

sell that was modified by the listing

There is no question under the agreement that another

realtor was entitled to sell the property and receive 60% of the 6%
commission

from

such

sale.

The

only

issue

created by

this

litigation is whether or not Unionamerica was obligated to refer a
walk-in purchaser such as Davis to Hal Taylor rather than referring
the walk-in to another relater who might become entitled to the 60%
portion of the commission.

Judge Croft specifically found that the

agreements did not expressly nor impliedly create an obligation on
the part of Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to Hal Taylor.

Appellant

has not cited a single case wherein language similar to that in the
listing agreement was interpreted to require the owner to refer a
walk-in to the listing realtor.

PCR believes that no such case was

cited because none exists.
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The closest analogous case PCR was able to find to the facts in
this situation is Whitney Investment Company v. Westview Devel~
ment Company, (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 594, 602-603, 78 Cal.Rptr. 302.
In Whitney the Court of Appeals in California faced a fact situation
similar to that involved in this case.

Whitney was a broker who sued

an owner to recover a commission due under an exclusive listing
agreement for sale of property wherein the owner had sold the
property

through

another

broker.

At

trial

the president of

plaintiff indicated that although the agreement was an exclusive
listing agreement which provided the owner had to pay commissions to
the plaintiff if the sale was made by either the owner,
broker,

or the listing broker,

implied there might be

sales

another

there was a side agreement that

by

other brokers.

In that

side

agreement there was a provision that the listing realtor was to get
50% and the selling broker was to get 50%.
properties through another broker.

The defendant sold 55

The plaintiff's claims for a

commission based on those facts was denied because, in the words of
the Court:
"While the words "hereby lists -·- -·- *
exclusively and irrevocably"
denote
an
exclusive agency prohibiting the owner from
selling through another agency (E. A. Strout,
Western Realty Agency v.
Gregoire,
101
Cal.App.2d 512, 517, 225 P.2d 585), the
provision of the agreement requiring payment of
commissions to plaintiffs if a sale is made by
another broker, as explained by parol evidence,
indicated that the parties intended to reserve
to Westview the right to sell through another
broker. Mr. Whitney, president of plaintiff
Whitney Investment Company, conceded that this
was the understanding of the parties./~
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"Thus, the sale through the other broker
constituted neither a breach by Westview nor
justification for plaintiffs' nonperformance."
The fact

situation in Whitney is somewhat similar to the fact

situation in the present case in that in both cases all of the
parties understood that the owner might sell through a different
broker.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell from the facts as

are set forth in Whitney whether or not the purchaser was a "walkin".

Whitney may be identical to the facts in this case but it is

impossible to tell from the opinion.
Appellant

would

apparently

like

the

Court

to

make

a

determination that the first encounter with any purchaser is in fact
the procuring cause.
respondents

This

been able to

Court has never so held nor have

find any court which holds the mere

encounter of the ultimate purchaser is sufficient to establish the
procuring

cause.

The

courts

that

have

analyzed what

would

constitute "procuring cause" have utilized a variety of tests to
determine whether or not a broker is a procuring cause of a sale.
Most of the cases in this context arise out of a dispute between an
owner and a broker as to whether or not a real estate commission is
even due.

This case differs from the normal case in that in this

action the owner does not contest that a commission is in fact due
and owing.

The only question is whether or not Skyline Realty was

the selling broker within the meaning of the settlement agreement
entered into between Hal Taylor and Unionamerica and/or whether or
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not Skyline Realty was the selling broker within the meaning of the
agreement between Hal Taylor and Skyline Realty which occurred
substantially prior to Davis' becoming interested in the property.
(T.

117-118.)

PCR agrees that one of the elements a court might look to in
order to determine whether or not a broker was the procuring cause of
a sale would involve the first encounter with a purchaser.

For

example, it is easy to conceive that in the sale of a home where a
broker takes a purchaser and shows the house and based upon such
showing the purchaser executes an earnest money,
probably the procuring cause of the sale.
follow as

appellant would apparently

the broker was

However, it does not

contend

that

the

first

encounter with a purchaser always determines what constitutes the
procuring cause of the sale.

In this instance the sale was not made

by merely telling the purchaser about the village property.
were numerous events which caused the sale to go through.
Statement

of Facts,

paragraph 30.

those

events

are

set

forth

There
In the

in detail in

An analysis of those facts reveals that most of the

work that caused the sale to go through actually occurred afterthe
October real estate contract was signed.

(Exhibit

"12")

Reed

testified that Cole worked full time to put the deal together and
Reed spent a substantial portion of his time from October until May.
Appellant has constructed a chart in its brief attempting to show
the various events that related to the sale.
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pp.

37-40.)

That chart is extremely misleading and is in fact

inaccurate in that it excludes events which are obviously relevant
to the determination.

Basically, all that occurred prior to Reed

and Cole getting involved was that Luce mentioned to Davis that he
knew of some property Davis might be interested in.

Luce caused a

communication between Volk and Davis to occur wherein they agreed
they would meet in Park City and look at the land.

In the meantime

Volk, president of Unionamerica, caused a feasibility study to be
sent to Davis so that Davis would have some familiarity with the
land.

That is the sum total of the occurrences prior to Davis coming

to Salt Lake City.

Appellant has attempted to take those out and

categorize them as constituting major events in the sale of the
land.

That is simply not the case.

The testimony fairly read, as is

set forth in paragraph 30 of PCR's

Statement of Facts,

would

indicate that almost all of the work which caused the sale of the
land to go through occurred after Reed and Cole became involved and
in fact was spearheaded by Reed and Cole.

Appellant does not even

mention that the seven month period that Cole spent full time and
Reed spent a substantial part of his time subsequent to the signing
of the agreement creating the conditions that made it close even
though Hal Taylor admitted at trial that most of the work on this
type of transaction was done after the signing of the initial
documents but prior to the closing.

(T. 159-160.)

It is difficult

to understand, given these facts, appellant's conclusion that the
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Trial Judge could not make a factual determination that PCR was the
procuring cause of this sale.

Such a determination simply ignores

the bulk of the evidence presented and places a total reliance on who
first encounters the buyer.
Although

it

is

apparently

appellant's

contention

that

respondents could not be the procuring cause because they didn't
introduce the buyer to the property, that theory has been expressly
rejected by

the

Supreme

Court

of

the

State of Colorado.

In

Kern v. Lewis, 472 P.2d 713 (Colo. 1970), the Supreme Court of the
State of Colorado held that a broker did not establish his right to a
commission where he merely introduced the eventual buyer to the
seller.

The Court held that the broker must play an active role in

concluding the sale in order to qualify as the predominating or
effective cause of the sale.

Mere introduction is not enough to

cause

a

the

broker

to

become

procuring

cause

just

as mere

introduction of Davis to the property was not the procuring cause.
It is necessary to look at the entire transaction as was done by the
Trial Court.
In Curtis v. Mortensen, 267 P.2d 237 (Utah 1954), this Court
held that a broker was entitled to a commission because he produced a
buyer

who

filed

a

lawsuit

in

order to

require a

specifically perform a contract to sell real estate.

seller to
This Court

held that when the buyer filed a lawsuit, he put himself in the
category that a broker is entitled to a commission when he has
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procured a written binding offer or agreement signed by a ready,
willing

and

able

purchaser.

Garff Realty Co. v. Better

Buildings, Inc., 234 P.2d 842 (Utah 1951); Reich v. Christopulos,
256 P.2d 238

(Utah

1953); Sproul v. Parks, 210 P.2d 436

1949); Ogden Savings Bank

& Trust

(Utah

Co. v. Blakely, 241 P. 221 (Utah

1925); and Lewis v. Dahl, 161 P.2d 362 (Utah 1945).

In the instant

case Reed and Cole showed the property, went to San Diego and
obtained a signed earnest money agreement which was accepted by
Unionamerica from the purchaser; and in fact presented that document
to Unionamerica.

Reed and Cole participated in the drafting and the

signing of the real estate agreement as well as all of the actions
that lead to the final closing.

There was substantial evidence from

which the Trial Court could find PCR the procuring cause.
In Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corporation,

205

P. 2d

1025

(Cal. 1949), the Supreme Court of the State of California held that
although a broker had not introduced the purchaser and the owner and
although the broker was not the first person to tell the ultimate
purchaser about the real estate, the Trial Court's finding that the
broker was the efficient cause of the sale could be supported by the
evidence which demonstrated that only through the efforts of the
broker over a period of many months were the parties ultimately
brought together.
the fact

That case is similar to the instant case in that

the broker had not first encountered the buyer did not

preclude the broker from being the procuring cause of the sale.
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Similarly, in Webster v. Parra, 237 P. 804 (Ct.App. 1925), the Court
of Appeals in California held that a broker was the efficient agent
or procuring cause of the sale and was entitled to the commission
even though the broker was not the first to bring the attention of
the purchaser to the property nor mention the price thereof.

The

Court held that a broker who has brought the minds of the parties
together resulting in a contract of purchase and sale is entitled to
the compensation.
Other

courts

have

reached

the

same

result.

In

Warrington v. Empey, 590 P.2d 1162 (Nev. 1979), the Supreme Court of
the State of Nevada reaffirmed an earlier determination and stated
as follows:
"It is impossible to measure in quantitative
units the efforts necessary to constitute
"procuring cause.
Suffice that on the one
hand it is "conduct that is more than merely
trifling." (Citation omitted.) Thus in nonexclusive situations, merely introducing the
eventual purchaser is not necessarily enough.
(Citation omitted.) The first broker still may
be shown to have abandoned efforts or been
helplessly ineffective. (Citations omitted.)"
In Vahlberg v. Callaway, 215 P.2d 543 (Okl. 1950), the Supreme Court
of the State of Oklahoma rejected the proposition that in order to be
a procuring cause,

a broker must call

the

prospective buyer's

attention to the property and start the negotiations which culminate
in a sale.

The Court took the more reasonable approach and held that

a broker was considered the procuring cause if the broker's efforts
were the foundation upon which the negotiations which result in a
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sale are based.

Even though in Vahlberg the broker had not first

introduced the party to the property, the Supreme Court held that
the Trial Court was able under the facts to determine that the broker
was the procuring cause of the sale.
None of these findings are contradicted by the case cited in
appellant's
1962).

brief of Frederick May v. Dunn,

368 P. 2d 266 (Utah

In that case this Court made an analysis of the terms "moving

cause,

"proximate

cause".

This Court held that:

cause,"

"actuating

cause,"

and

"procuring

"the extent to which the broker's efforts must
induce the sale depends on the terms used on the
contract and the understanding and intention of
the parties in making such agreement and the
facts and circumstances of the case. Usually,
whether the broker first---approaches, or brings
to the attention of the buyer that the property
is for sale, or brings the buyer into the
picture,
has
considerable
weight
in
determining whether the buyer is the procuring
cause of the sale." (Emphasis added. )
Appellant attempts to read that as requiring that the broker in fact
introduce the property to the buyer.
the meaning of the ruling.

PCR does not believe that is

PCR believes that Frederick May requires

a district court to look at the facts of each case and determine
whether a broker caused the sale to occur.
One further factor the Court ought to consider in determining
whether or not PCR is entitled to a seller's commission would
involve

the

meaning

of

the

agreement

between appellant

and

Unionamerica which resulted in the settlement of the earlier
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litigation.
made:

In that agreement (Ex.

2) the following statement is

"On all property listed with Taylor, he will be required to

perform the usual real estate broker activities and will be entitled
to a commission rate, of six percent (6%), and Taylor will further
agree to a fee-splitting arrangement giving sixty percent (60%) to
the selling broker and forty percent (40%) to the listing broker."
At trial Stevenson who ~as one of the participants who negotiated
and signed Exhibit 2 testified that his understanding of what was
meant by a selling realtor in the settlement agreement would be one
who brought a signed earnest money offer which could be and was
ultimately accepted by Unionamerica.
also made such a finding.
that

given the evidence

(T.

378.)

The Trial Court

(Appendix A, Finding 2 7. )
received by

the Trial

PCR asserts

Court,

it was

completely and properly within the prerogative of Judge Sawaya to
make a finding that PCR was the selling broker within the meaning of
the settlement agreement.

That finding alone under a third party

beneficiary theory of contracts would justify PCR's receipt of the
percentage of the commission required by the agreement.
POINT II
PCR IS NOT BARRED FROM RECOVERY BECAUSE IT LACKS CAPACITY
AND/OR STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION.
PCR will address the issues of standing and capacity jointly
since they are related.

It is apparently appellant's contention

that PCR is precluded from obtaining a real estate commission
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because:

(1)

PCR was not a licensed broker and therefore lacked

capacity to sue; (2)
counterclaim
certificate
Realty.

under
of

PCR conducted its business and prosecuted its
an

assumed

assumed name -

name

without

having

filed

a

that assumed name being Skyline

PCR is treating these as one issue since Skyline Realty was

clearly a licensed brokerage branch office under the laws of the
State of Utah.

(Exhibits 43, 44, 45.)

If PCR was properly acting

under the assumed name of Skyline Realty, then the argument would
automatically fail that PCR was not a licensed real estate broker.
Appellant's

capacity

argument

was

predicated

upon

the

following assertions:
1.

PCR never filed a certificate of doing business in the

name of Skyline Realty.
2.

The Department of Business Regulations did not have a

Park City Reservations,

Inc.

listed as a broker during the

relevant period involved in this action.
Reservations,

Inc.

was

never

licensed

Since Park City
according

to

the

Secretary of State to do business in the name of Skyline
Realty,

any

recognition

by

the

Department

of

Business

Regulations as to Skyline Realty would not grant capacity to
PCR.
The evidence relating to whether or not PCR had filed an
assumed name certificate in the name of Skyline Realty was presented
on January 30,

1980,

the last day of trial that testimony was
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received.

On January 30, for the first time in this action after Mr.

Linebaugh

had

rested

on

behalf

of

the

appellant

and

after

respondents had commenced presentation of their defense, appellant
introduced Exhibit 52 which was a certificate from the Secretary of
State which would indicate that a search had been made and no record
existed that Reed, Cole or PCR had ever filed to use the name Skyline
Realty.

At the time thi~ document was introduced, counsel for PCR

objected on the grounds that the document was hearsay.

Rule 63 (17)

allows certain hearsay evidence to prove the absence of a record in a
specified official office.

That rule is subject to the requirement

of Rule 64 which states that a party offering such a writing must
have delivered a copy of it to each adverse party a reasonable time
before trial unless the judge finds that such adverse party has not
been unfairly

surprised by the

failure

to

deliver such copy.

Counsel for respondents objected to the admissability of the Exhibit
based upon Rule 64.

(T. 638-641.)

The Court overruled the objection

and admitted the evidence.
Over night, counsel for Reed, Cole and Skyline attempted to
determine why

no

permitted PCR to

certificate had been filed which would have
use

the name

Skyline Realty.

Trial counsel

contacted the attorney who represented PCR in 1974 when its Articles
of Incorporation were filed.

Counsel was advised that there was

some serious mistake because the former counsel, Mr. D. Kendall
Perkins,

(the name is misspelled in the transcript in that he is
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called "Mr. Perkinson") indicated he in fact had filed an assumed
name certificate which would have allowed PCR to operate in the name
of Skyline Realty.

When counsel learned that the certificate had in

fact been filed and that there was probably an error in the Secretary
of State's office, both sides had already rested.

At that time,

prior to the closing arguments being made, counsel for PCR moved
that the Court allow reopening of evidence so that PCR could call Mr.
Perkins

to

testify

certificate.

concerning the

(T. 651.)

proffer of evidence.

filing

of the assumed name

The motion was denied and counsel made a
(T.

653.)

The proffer indicates that Mr.

Perkins would testify if allowed that he sent to the Secretary of
State the Articles of Incorporation for Park City Reservations,
Inc., including a certificate which would have allowed PCR to do
business

in the name of Skyline Realty.

The proffer further

included the statement that the Secretary of State sent a document
back to Mr. Perkins requiring a release from an individual who had a
trade mark in the name Skyline Realty.

Mr. Perkins indicated he

obtained the release and resent the materials to the Secretary of
State in a letter dated December 10, 1974.

On December 11, 1974 the

Articles of Incorporation of PCR were accepted by the Secretary of
State and a certificate of incorporation was issued.
Subsequent to the final argument, PCR's counsel determined
that certain facts exist which demonstrate how PCR was prejudiced
and the Trial

Court was

inadvertently mislead by appellant's
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counsel.

Exhibit 52 is an affidavit from the Secretary of State

which indicates that neither Harry Reed, Gary Cole, nor PCR ever
filed an assumed name certificate in the name of Skyline Realty.
Since Exhibit 52 was introduced right at the end of trial and was
never given to respondents prior to that time, PCR did not have a
chance to check the underlying facts with the Secretary of State.
Subsequent to the trial PCR has had that opportunity and attached to
this brief as Appendix B is an affidavit from Mr. Douglas S. Foxley,
an attorney with the Secretary of State's office, that indicates
that the information on Exhibit 52 was in fact erroneous.

Harry

Reed, in 1973, filed personally for the use of the name "Skyline
Realty of Park City".

The affidavit of Mr. Foxley indicates that

apparently when Exhibit 52 was prepared a computer search was made
wherein the information on Exhibit 52 was extracted.

However, a

hand search through the file located Attachment 1 to Appendix B
which was missed initially.

Therefore evidence could have been

presented that Harry Reed filed for the use of the name Skyline
Realty in 1973.
Additionally,

a search of the records at the Secretary of

State's office and an analysis of the correspondence that went back
and forth between the attorney for PCR and the Secretary of State
revealed that very probably PCR filed an assumed name certificate to
be allowed to use the name "Skyline Realty".

Although the Secretary

of State's office is unable to find the application for the d/b/a in
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the name of Skyline Realty, there are enough documents in the file to
indicate that in fact such a document was filed and was probably
lost by the Secretary of State's office.

Attachment 3 to the Foxley

Affidavit (Appendix B) is a letter dated November 18, 1974, to D.
Kendall Perkins from the office of the Secretary of State.

It should

be noted that Mr. Perkins is the attorney who PCR attempted to call
after evidence was closed who would have testified he did file for a
d/b/a in the name of Skyline Realty on behalf of PCR.

Attachment 3

indicates that Mr. Perkins was told the name Skyline Realty was not
available unless Mr.

Perkins

Williamson to use the name.

obtained the consent of one Mr.

Clearly, the Secretary of State must

have had on file the application by PCR to use the name Skyline
Realty in order to cause the November 18th letter to be generated.
Mr. Perkins on November 27 sent a letter to Mr. Williamson and
obtained his release for the name "Skyline Realty".
attachment 2 to the Foxley Affidavit.
indicates

that

in

the

file

of

That letter is

The affidavit of Mr. Foxley

Park City Reservations, Inc.,

Attachment 2 referring to Skyline Realty was found.

Attachment 4 to

the Foxley Affidavit, a letter dated December 10, 1974, from Mr.
Perkins to the Secretary of State's office indicates that Mr.
Perkins forwarded the release by Mr. Williamson so that Mr. Perkins'
client could use the name "Skyline Realty".

One day after Mr.

Perkins sent Attachment 4 to the Secretary of State, PCR's Articles
of Incorporation were filed and accepted by the Secretary of State.
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At that time it would appear that the assumed name filing for Skyline
Realty was

lost by the Secretary of State.

In any event, it is

absolutely clear that PCR's Articles of Incorporation were filed
jointly with a document that requested the use of the name Skyline
Realty.

In addition thereto,

through its attorney,

it

is absolutely clear that PCR,

did all that was necessary to obtain the

rights to the use of the name.

If there was any error it would appear

that the Secretary of State's office lost the application for the
assumed name after it had been filed.

Certainly the Secretary of

State had some piece of paper before it when it generated the
November 18, 1974 letter (Attachment 3 to Appendix B) relating to
the use of the name Skyline Realty (which was found in the Park City
Reservations, Inc. file).
All

of

the

information set

forth

above

would have been

available at the trial if appellant had complied with Rule 64 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence and had given respondents notice of the
official documents they sought to introduce.

That the surprise was

potentially prejudicial is clear from the records of the Secretary
of State after a more thorough search was made.
the

requisite

filings

and is

not

PCR did in fact make

barred by any

statute

from

maintaining this action.
Even assuming, arguendo, that appellant was correct and in fact
PCR did not meet the requisite standards that it must file an assumed
name certificate with the Secretary of State's office, it does not
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d

follow that PCR is barred from maintaining this action.

The Trial

Court ruled that appellant was precluded from raising a defense of
lack of capacity by virtue of the fact that appellant waived such
defense.
A defense

that

a

party

has

not

filed

an

assumed name

certificate is a "capacity" defense rather than a defense that goes
to the merits.

Union Trust Co. v. Quigley, 259 P. 28 (Wash. 1927).

Capacity defenses under the laws of the State of Utah are governed by
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 9 specifically

requires that when a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued
or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall
include such supporting particulars as are within the pleaders'
knowledge.

A defense of

lack of capacity clearly requires a

pleading so that the opposite party can prepare to meet any claims
that are involved.

This Court has had occasion to determine whether

or not waiver of a capacity argument would occur without such a
pleading.

In Tooele Meat and Storage Co. v. Fite Candy Co., 168

P. 427 (Utah 1917) this Court held that an objection of the lacking
of legal capacity was waived unless raised either by answer or by
demurer.
In this instance it would appear that the Trial Court properly
applied the doctrine of waiver.

(Appendix A, Conclusions of Law
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10.)

The appellant in this case had knowledge of the purported lack

of capacity at least as of January 4, 1980.

January 4, 1980 is the

date that appellant obtained Exhibit 52 from the office of the
Secretary of State.

The trial of this case began January 14th.

Exhibit 52 was not even introduced nor was a copy given to any of the
respondents until January 30.

There were at least 26 days during

which the appellant could have given notice to the respondents of
the capacity defense.

However, appellant indicated that it did not

give notice because it could not file any motion with the Court
within 30 days as of the commencement of trial because of local Rule
10 of the Third District Rules.

That argument totally lacks merit.

The obvious purpose of the requirement that a capacity defense be
pleaded is to give notice to the opposing parties so that they may
make whatever preparations are necessary.

Although the appellant

may have been precluded from filing a motion for summary judgment or
some other motion, appellant was not precluded from giving notice to
opposing counsel that such a defense would be raised.

It would have

been a very simple matter for appellant's counsel to lift up the
telephone

and

call

counsel

for

respondents

appellant intended to plead such a defense.

and indicate that
At least respondents

then would have had the opportunity of analyzing the facts and
determining whether or not the defense had merit.

Further, Section

42-2-10 of the Utah Code Annotated (the section dealing with assumed
names) provides t h at a party cannot go forth
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a lawsuit "until
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the provisions of this Chapter have been complied with."

It would

have been a very simple matter to notify the respondents so that the
respondents could determine whether or not they had complied with
the

requirements

of

Title

42 relating to

assumed names.

As

appellant is well aware, this matter could easily have been resolved
by respondents in that proper filings could have been made to allow
this case to proceed on the merits if such filings were deemed
necessary.

The only possible explanation for appellant's waiting

until the last day of evidence is that appellant hoped to accomplish
an ambush and cause this action to not be decided on the merits but
upon an argument never previously raised.

Such a procedure is

wholly improper and the Trial Court correctly disallowed it.
Appellant's only response is the contention that appellant was
lulled into its error by virtue of a communication from counsel for
PCR indicating that the proper party defendants ought to be PCR.
Given the facts set forth on pages 42-46 of this brief, it is still
the position of PCR's counsel that the proper party was PCR and not
the individuals.

However, it doesn't matter.

The bottom line is

that plaintiff's counsel waited until the last day to introduce
evidence he had knowledge of substantially prior to the date of its
introduction.
defendants.

That evidence could have been responded to by the

That evidence went to capacity which is a defense that

requires advance notice.

Further, the defendants could have filed

whatever papers had to be filed to allow this case to proceed on the
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merits.

Given the facts involved, it was not error for the trial

Court to determine that appellant had waived any such defense of
capacity if such a defense ever existed.
Appellant's argument that defendants could have sought a Stey
in order to respondents' counsel to go to the Secretary of State's
office is also without merit.

The burdens on the Court's calendar

are such that the Court was not required nor were the defendants
required to cause such a filing to occur before the action could be
completed.

Had appellant acted properly and advised respondents as

to the proposed defense as soon as plaintiffs became aware of it,
then all of the necessary actions could have been completed prior to
the trial and no delay would have resulted.

Given such facts it is

entirely proper to find that any defense of lack of capacity was
waived by virtue of the failure to bring it forth as soon as
appellant had knowledge of the requisite facts.
Appellant also contends that PCR was precluded from maintaini§
this action because it is not a registered broker with the Depart·
ment of Business Regulations.

Exhibit D.

43 is an affidavit of

Steven J. Francis, the director of the real estate division of the
Department of Business Regulations for the State of Utah.

Mr.

Francis indicates that at all times relevant to this action Harry F.
Reed was a properly registered real estate broker with the State of
Utah and was a broker/branch manager for Skyline Realty.

If PCR is

correct in its contention that in fact Skyline Realty was an assumed
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name of PCR, or that appellant had waived its right to challenge the
assumed name, appellant's contention must automatically fail.
The facts with regard to the timing of the presentation of this
defense are the same as to the assumed name defense, appellant
waited until the trial was substantially completed and then raised
the defense for the first time.

The Trial Court ruled that if such a

defense had once existed, it was waived.
Even if PCR is in error as to the assumed name issue, it does
not mean that PCR must lose because it is not a registered broker.
One of the issues to be determined is whether or not the corporation
itself must hold a brokerage license or whether it is adequate if the
corporation employs a licensed broker who is the person involved in
the transaction.

Section 61-2-18 (a) reads as follows:

" (a) No person, partnership, association or
corporation shall bring or maintain an action
in any court of this state for the recovery of
commission, a fee, or compensation for any act
done or service rendered the doing or rendering
of which is prohibited under the provisions of
this act to other than licensed real estate
brokers, unless such person was duly licensed
hereunder as a real estate broker at the time of
the doing of such act or the rendering of such
service." (Emphasis added.)
The statute does not require the corporation itself hold a brokerage
license.

The statute merely prohibits a corporation as well as

other entities from maintaining an action for the recovery of a
commission if the person who participated in the recovery of the
commission is not a licensed real estate broker.

In this instance
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all of the parties agree that the communications relating to the
sale of this property were between two licensed brokers, Harry Reed
and Hal Taylor.

Harry Reed testified he was employed by Skyline

which he understood to be an assumed name of PCR.

Skyline Realty was

listed with the Department of Business Regulations as a brokerage.
It would be a harsh application of this statute if PCR was precluded
from the recovery of mcr.ies that would otherwise be due and owing
because there was no brokerage license issued in the specific name
of PCR even though PCR' s employee was licensed as a broker.
The legislative purpose of the statute appears to be to protect
the public from unscrupulous and/or untrained individuals who might
be involved in selling land in order to get commissions.
case all of the public protections were met.

In this

Reed was a duly

licensed broker and Skyline was registered with the Department of
Business Regulations.
Appellant has not cited to a single case which precludes the
recovery of a commission that has facts such as these.
cited

by

precluded

appellant wherein the
involved

a

recovery

transaction

of a

wherein

Each case

commission was

the

people

participated in the transaction were not licensed brokers.

who
In each

and every case cited by appellant wherein the Court struck down the
right to obtain a commission, the person who was involved in the
transaction was not a licensed broker.

There is no case cited by

appellant analogous to this one wherein a corporation acting through
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its employee (a licensed real estate broker) sought to obtain an
earned commission and was refused such commission because the
corporation itself was not licensed.
reason why the Trial Court was

In fact,

correct

capacity defense raised by appellant.

this is another

in ruling against the

PCR believes that this Court

is entitled to take judicial notice of the records on file with the
Department of Business Regulations for companies who engage in real
estate transactions.

PCR has been advised that approximately one-

half of the companies do not have brokerage licenses in the name of
the corporations but in fact maintain the licenses in the names of
persons employed by the corporations who are brokers.

Indeed, this

Court can take judicial notice that the Department of Business
Regulations will only grant a broker's license to a corporation if
there is a qualified person within the corporation with whom the
license may rest.

There is no telling the amount of damage that

might be done

real estate transactions that

to

are currently

occurring, have occurred, and will occur if this Court adopts the
construction of the statute sought by appellant.

At least, that

type of evidence is something that could have been developed at
trial had sufficient notice of the nature of the capacity defense
been given prior to the last days of the trial.
This Court has recently decided a case wherein the Court looked
to the substance of the transaction and allowed a commission to be
earned even though the party seeking the commission was not a
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broker.

In

Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development

Company, 614 P.2d 155 (Utah 1980), this Court decided that Global
Recreation was entitled to a commission even though Global was
neither a broker nor a licensed real estate salesman.

The Court

analyzed the facts and determined that the requirements of the
statute were met.

The Court held that one Richardson, who was a

principal of AID, had a broker's license.
broker based upon Richardson's license.

AID held itself out as a
The Court held that the

purchasers of the Cedar Hills property were fully protected as
contemplated by the statute because both a licensed broker and a
licensed salesman were involved in the

land sales.

The Court

further held that the purpose of Section 61-2-1 was not to protect
real estate developers who seek relief from their own contractual
obligations as does appellant herein.

Rather, the Court held that

the purpose of the statute was for protection of members of the
public who rely on licensed real estate brokers and salesmen to
perform tasks that require a high degree of honesty and integrity.
Clearly, if AID (which was not a broker but employed a broker just as
PCR d/b/a Skyline employed a broker) qualified the transaction under
the statute, then Harry Reed and Hal Taylor qualify the transaction
currently before the Court.
At the trial PCR' s counsel made a motion to amend the pleadings
to

conform

to

counterclaimant.

the

evidence

(T. 625.)

and

insert

Harry

Reed

as

a

The evidence is clear that two real
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estate brokers were involved in the transaction - Harry Reed and Hal
Taylor.

PCR's counsel moved that Harry Reed be substituted as an

additional party on the counterclaim since he was involved with
Taylor and was clearly a duly licensed broker.
motion under

advisement

and

never made

a

The Court took the

ruling because

it

eventually ruled appellant had waived the right to make a capacity
argument

and that

counterclaimant,

within the meaning of the

statute, was a duly licensed real estate broker.

If appellant is

correct and the Trial Court was wrong in its ruling, then the motion
to substitute Harry Reed as a proper party in interest should have
been granted.

Since all of the facts are exactly identical there was

no possible unfair prejudice to plaintiff.

The people who caused

the sale to go through, Harry Reed and Gary Cole acting on behalf of
Park City Reservations, Inc., should not be denied a commission
given these facts.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO AWARD DAMAGES
TO TAYLOR FOR BREACH OF A PURPORTED FIDUCIARY DUTY.
1.

Appellant apparently relies on the following facts in

support of its theory that PCR breached a fiduciary obligation:
A.

Reed and Cole did not investigate appellant's contractual

relation

with

Stevenson

when

first

contacted

by

Stevenson.

(Appellant's Brief page 53.)
B.

Cole sent a registration letter setting forth PCR's having

shown the property to Davis without disclosing that Unionamerica
had "found and negotiated with Davis without the assistance of Reed
or Cole."

(Appellant's Brief page 53.)
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C.

When Reed approached Taylor to confirm that Taylor would

split the commission on a 60/40 basis, Reed did not tell Taylor that
Unionamerica had first encountered the buyer without the assistance
of Reed or Cole.
D.

(Appellant's Brief page 53.)

Reed lied to Taylor as to the source of the buyer in that

Reed told Taylor that Cole had skied with the buyer.

(Appellant's

Brief page 54. )
Items A through C above are all predicated upon the assumption
that Reed and/or Cole had some sort of obligation to tell Taylor that
Unionamerica had first encountered the buyer.

If the predicate is

incorrect, then any possible fault relating to items A through C
above are also incorrect.

It is PCR' s position that Reed and Cole

were not under the obligation Taylor is seeking to impose.

The fact

that Reed told Taylor that Cole had encountered the buyer through
skiing does not give rise to a cause of action.

Reed testified that

when he approached Taylor to tell him they had a buyer, he was met
with extreme hostility.

At that point when Taylor asked where Reed

had found the buyer, Reed merely stated Cole had skied with Davis.
(T. 469.)
possible

It was apparent that Reed was trying to minimize any
conflict

conspiracy

to

encountered.

hide

with

Taylor.

(T. 468-470.)

from Taylor where

There

was

the purchaser was

no

first

On the very same day that Reed told Taylor that Cole

had skied with Davis, Taylor asked Stevenson if he knew where Davis
had been found.

Stevenson on that day told Taylor that he had
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referred Davis to Cole.

Although Reed made a mistake in telling

Taylor that Cole had skied with Davis, there is no possible manner in
which Taylor was injured by virtue of that statement.

Taylor did

absolutely nothing in reliance upon Reed's assertion.

There is not

one item of evidence in the record that Reed's statement to Taylor
had any adverse affect upon Taylor whatsoever.

There is no way

appellant can claim such an adverse affect because Taylor learned
immediately

(on the same day) where Davis had been encountered.

Therefore, the Trial Court was correct in refusing to award Taylor
damages based upon Reed's statement to Taylor.
Appellant's position that PCR breached a fiduciary obligation
and appellant is entitled to damages must fail for several reasons:
1.

Reed and Cole were not under any duties to investigate the

listing contract between Taylor and Unionamerica.

Appellant has

cited no case that would put one realtor under a duty to investigate
a property owner's contractual relationship with another realtor.
Reed and Cole were approached by Stevenson because Stevenson wanted
their assistance to properly present the property to Davis.
Stevenson had given an listing to Taylor,

Because

does not mean that

Stevenson also agreed to refer every possible purchaser to Taylor.
In fact, PCR is aware of no listing contract utilized in Park City
nor in any other area that would require such a result.

Since there

was no reason for Reed or Cole to anticipate that Stevenson had some
sort of special deal with Taylor that would require Stevenson to
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send the purchaser to Taylor, then there was no reason to explore the
contractual

relationship

between

Stevenson

and

Taylor

before

discussing the property with Davis.
2.

Even if appellant were correct that Reed and Cole had the

duty to determine the underlying contractual obligation between
Taylor and Unionamerica before accepting the referral, there is no
possible manner in which appellant can demonstrate harm.

Neither

the listing agreement nor the settlement agreement (Exhibits 2 and
3) require walk-ins to be referred to Taylor.

Had Reed and Cole

understood the entire underlying transaction between Taylor and
Unionamerica, it would not have changed the result whatsoever.

Reed

and Cole were entitled to accept the referrals from Unionamerica
because

there

was

nothing

in

the

contract

that

precluded

Unionamerica from sending the prospective purchaser to a realtor
other than Taylor.

Therefore, had Reed and Cole advised Taylor as to

everything prior to accepting the referral, they would have still
been entitled to accept such referral.
3.

Appellant is in error in contending that Harry Reed is a

sub-agent under appellant and therefore owes appellant a fiduciary
obligation.

The law relating to whether a selling broker is an agent

of the owner or of the listing broker is far from clear.

It is

obvious the selling broker performs functions for both the buyer and
the seller.

What the selling broker is called appears to be a

function of the facts.

In Frisell v. Newman, 429 P.2d 864 (Wash.
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1967),

the court faced a situation where the selling broker had

possibly participated in material ommissions which hurt the owner.
In that situation,

the court determined that the selling broker

should be called a sub-agent of the owner in order that the selling
broker was put under a duty to let the owner know of facts and
circumstances within the selling broker's knowledge.
there is no possible claim that PCR,
fiduciary obligation to the owner.

In this case

Reed or Cole violated any

The owner was fully informed of

the facts at all times.
In Pumphrey v. Quillen, 141 N.E. 2d 675 (Ohio App. 1955) the
Ohio appellate court determined that a selling realtor was not ever
an agent of the owner in a situation where the selling real estate
agent had apparently misled the purchaser.

The court held that the

only relationship between the selling broker and the owner was the
multiple listing group and that when the owner signed a contract of
sale they had no knowledge of any misrepresentation made by the
selling broker.
The fact

that courts have characterized the relationships

between owners, listing realtors, and selling realtors in several
different manners demonstrates there is no one universal rule.

(See

71 ALR 3rd 586 for an article analyzing different courts that have
found real estate arrangements to constitute partnerships, joint
ventures,

agency contracts,

and employment contracts.

Numerous

cases are cited wherein none of the relationships were found to
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exist·)

It is clear that an analysis of the case law leads to the

proposition

that

the

courts

do

not

universally

support

the

proposition that a selling broker is always a sub-agent of the
listing broker.

The facts of each case would have to be analyzed to

determine how the relationships ought to be characterized.

In this

action it is apparent that for some purposes Skyline was an agent of
the purchaser as well .:.::; an agent of the seller.
have been a

third party beneficiary to a

Skyline may even

contract between the

listing broker and the owner in that Exhibit 2 provided that any
selling broker would be entitled to 60% of the commission.

In any

event,

fair

given the

facts

of

this

case

it

would not

be

a

characterization to conclude that Skyline was just Taylor's agent.
4.

The Trial Court was correct in not granting any damages

because there was no damage evidence introduced which rationally
relates to this cause of action.

Even if a fiduciary relationship

existed between Taylor and Reed, there was no evidence presented how
Taylor was
obligation.

damaged by virtue
The Trial

Court

of

the breach of the

determined that

fiduciary

Unionamerica was

entitled to refer and Skyline was entitled to accept a walk-in from
an outside source.

Since the parties were entitled to do what they

did, it is very difficult to understand appellant's damage theory.
Appellant appears to merely be saying that since PCR did not tell
appellant everything it knew about the transaction, PCR ought not to
be entitled to receive any commission.

Appellant was under a duty to

-60Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

show damages if in fact fiduciary obligations were breached and
explain to the Trial Court in a rational manner the relationship
between the breach of the fiduciary duty and the damages sought.
That was

never done because the facts

simply do not

support

appellant's position.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
PCR will not repeat the arguments made by Unionamerica with
regard to punitive damages.

PCR believes that Unionamerica' s

position is correct and in order to avoid repetition will not
restate the argument set forth therein.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, these respondents
respectfully

request

that

the Court deny the relief sought by

appellant and affirm the Trial Court's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

.1.Q_ day

of April, 1981.

MARTINEAU, ROOKER, LARSEN

& KIMBALL

s~c~c~

1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 532-7840
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents Park City Reservations,
Inc., dba Skyline Realty, Harry F.
Reed, and Gary Cole
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